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The Wage Premium of Communist Party Membership: 
Evidence from China 
 
Social status and political connections could confer large economic benefits to 
an individual. Previous studies focused on China examine the relationship 
between Communist party membership and earnings and find a positive 
correlation. However, this correlation may be partly or totally spurious, thereby 
generating upwards-biased estimates of the importance of political party 
membership. Using data from three surveys spanning more than three decades, 
we estimate the causal effect of Chinese party membership on monthly earnings 
in in China. We find that, on average, membership in the Communist party of 
China increases monthly earnings and we find evidence that the wage premium 
has grown in recent years. We explore for potential mechanisms and we find 
suggestive evidence that improvements in one’s social network, acquisition of 
job-related qualifications and improvement in one’s social rank and life 
satisfaction likely play an important role. (JEL D31, J31, P2) 
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I. Introduction 
Because party membership can confer large economic benefits, numerous economics 
studies have examined the how political and social status influence later-life economic outcomes. 
Recent empirical research in developing countries documents the causal impact of political status 
on investments (Fishman, 2001), firm value (Erkal & Kali, 2012), and wages (Li et al., 2007). 
China’s rapid economic development and its one-party government system make for an ideal 
context to examine the interplay between political status and economic outcomes. Previous 
studies document that political status in China can provide numerous economic benefits 
(Morduch & Sicular, 2000, Li et al., 2007, Appleton et al., 2003, Wu, Wu & Rui, 2010). Party 
membership provides access to a social network that can improve employment outcomes. 
Previous economics studies have examined how a social network or improved social status can 
influence one’s economic outcomes.1  
In this study, we estimate the wage premium associated with membership in the Chinese 
Communist Party over the span of almost four decades. We use data from the China Household 
Income Project (CHIP), China Housing Survey (CHS), and the Chinese General Social Survey 
(CGSS). The Communist party of China is the largest political party in the world (Yuen, 2013). 
With over eighty million members and growth of an average of one million members per year, 
the Chinese Communist party will likely remain the largest party in the world (Yuen, 2013).2 
Previous estimates of the effect of political status on economic outcomes in China rely on 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations using observational data. Because such study designs 
are not fully equipped to disentangle the influence of party membership from the influence of 
other background characteristics on employment outcomes, they do not detect true causal effects 
of party membership on wages. To estimate the effect of Communist party membership on 
monthly earnings, we employ a propensity score matching method (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983, 
1984; Imbens 2004; Imbens & Wooldridge 2009; Imbens & Rubin 2014; Abadie et al. 2003; 
                                                 
1 Montgomery (1991) models the role of social networks in employee referrals for better employment prospects and how networks could improve 
the employer-employee match. Other studies document the effect of various types of social network on employment outcomes – e.g., fraternity and 
sorority membership at an American university (Marmaros & Sacerdote, 2001), ethnic networks (Patacchini & Zenou, 2012), and “guanxi” 
networks in China on job allocation (Bian, 1994). 
2 More than 80 percent of upperclassmen at Chinese universities apply for Communist party membership (The Economist, 2014). Instead of 
joining the party for its ideals, many aspire to join it because of their beliefs that party membership will provide better job market prospects – 
party membership is increasingly seen as a resume booster (Yuen, 2013). 
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Angrist & Krueger 2000; Angrist & Pischke 2009). We also perform various robustness checks 
to bolster the credibility of our results. Although the matching methods offers several important 
advantages over the ordinary least squares (OLS) method, it is also prone to bias in the presence 
of selection on observables. To gauge the presence of potential bias based on unobservables , we 
bound the magnitude of the potential bias using Rosenbaum bounds. 
We report three main findings. First, using a propensity score matching technique, we find 
that Communist party members, on average, earn approximately a little over 20 percent more in 
monthly earnings compared to non-members. Our estimated effect size adds to existing empirical 
literature using data from developing countries that documents substantial wage benefits 
premium associated with political status and social connections (Siddique, 2010; Madheswaram 
and Attewell, 2007; Das and Dutta, 2007). We further bolster the credibility of our estimated 
effect sizes with several additional robustness checks: we examine the sensitivity of our results 
with respect to the matching algorithm method, the estimation technique and finally we gauge 
the potential selection bias due selection of unobservable variables using a Rosenbaum bounds 
method. Second, because we rely on data over three decades and three major data surveys, we 
find suggestive evidence that this wage premium has grown modestly over the last three decades. 
In both the ordinary least squares and propensity score matching results, we detect evidence that 
the wage premium associated with party membership has increased. Finally, we explore for the 
relative importance of various channels in explaining the linkage between party membership and 
better wage outcomes. Party membership could translate into better employment outcomes – on 
the intensive and extensive margin -- because of several distinct mechanisms.  Party membership 
could confer access to a wider social network of local party members and members could get a 
higher number of job referrals or access to better types of jobs (Morduch & Sicular, 2000). These 
job referrals could serve as a device that assists in a better employer-employee match in the long-
run. Finally, some employment opportunities in provincial and local governments are only open 
to party members (The Economist, 2014). Based on the available longitudinal data from one of 
the data surveys, we explore for four main channels: strength of one’s social network, human 
capital acquisition as one becomes a party member, improvement in one’s social rank and overall 
life satisfaction. We provide suggestive evidence that at least three important channels likely 
exert very strong positive influence on one’s wages when one joins the Communist Party: we see 
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strong evidence that the strongest impact on wage seems to be through an improvement the 
likelihood of one holding a government job, improvement in one’s position within one’s job 
hierarchy, and improvement in one’s overall social rank. We also see some evidence (though not 
statistically significant) that members report being happier than non-members. In summary, all of 
the findings provide robust evidence that political connections can play an important economic 
role in the world's most populous economy. 
Our study contributes the empirical literature on the economic benefits of political 
affiliation in at least four major ways.3 First, we examine the progression the earnings premium 
of party membership over almost four decades in China. Previous studies on the topic rely 
exclusively on single datasets and therefore can isolate the magnitude of the wage premium due 
party membership only for a single year. We combine data from three major Chinese data 
surveys – the China Household Income Project (CHIP), China Housing Survey (CHS), and the 
Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) – that collect data on party membership, one earnings 
and contain rich information on various labour market factors. Because we rely on multiple 
datasets over more than three decades, we can shed light on the relationship over a longer period 
of time. Second, we provide convincing empirical evidence that the earnings premium associated 
with party membership has either remained constant or has grown. Third, we show that when we 
estimate the earnings premium using the propensity matching method4, we find evidence that the 
OLS estimates are consistently lower than the estimated effect size using the matching method. 
This finding is consistent with positive self-selection (Roy, 1951) into party membership.5 
Finally, and perhaps the most novel aspect of this study, is that we are able to shed light on 
important channels that underlie the relationship between one’s party affiliation and earnings. 
We detect suggestive evidence that when one joins the party, one’s growing social network, 
                                                 
3 Extensive research on the caste system in India as status differentiation documents persistent economic impacts (Singh, 2010, Das & Dutta, 
2007, Attewell & Madheswaran, 2007, Siddique, 2010, Eswaran et al., 2013). Siddique (2010) finds that, on average, low-caste applicants have to 
send 20 percent more resumes to get the same amount of call-backs. Madheswaram and Attewell (2007) and Das and Dutta (2007) document 
difference between low-caste and high-caste workers from 15 percent to 30 percent. Previous studies also examine the effect of status in the 
context of organizations and social networks (Patacchini & Zenou, 2012, Marmaros and Sacerdote, 2001). Patacchini and Zenou (2012) find that 
living in an area with a high concentration of those with the same ethnic status as you increase the probability of finding a job through social 
contacts. Marmaros and Sacerdote (2001) find that social networks play a large role in finding a job for students at Dartmouth College. Closely 
tied with the idea of social networks is social capital, defined by the density and diversity of one’s social networks (Growiec & Growiec, 2015). 
Zhang and Anderson (2014) find that “bridging” social capital yields positive economic returns, while “bonding” social capital does not3; 
Growiec and Growiec (2015) find that the returns to “bridging” social capital are inverted U-shaped. 
4 We estimate the causal effect of Communist party membership on wages by using a propensity score matching technique (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 
1983, 1984; Imbens, 2004; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009; Imbens & Rubin, 2014; Abadie et al., 2003; Angrist & Krueger, 2000; Angrist & Pischke, 
2009).   
5 Positive selection implies that workers that party members generally have better unobservable characteristics that drive selection into both party 
membership and higher earnings.  
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higher perceived social and job status and access to better jobs likely plays a very large role in 
driving higher earnings. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II provided background on the 
party membership process, the various channels underpinning the relationship between party 
affiliation and higher earnings, and previous empirical studies. Section III details the data. 
Section IV outlines our identification strategy and Section V discusses results. Section VI 
discusses various robustness checks. Section VII concludes. 
II. Background                 
A. Communist Party in China 
The Communist Party of China is the largest political party in the world. With a 
membership of almost 88 million, the number of people in the communist party is greater than 
the population of Germany. However, with a total population of 1.37 billion, the party consists of 
less than 7 percent of the population (South China Morning Post, 2015). Recently, the party has 
been trending towards a more youthful and better educated member base. In 2014, 2.1 million 
new members were accepted. About 81 percent of new members were under 35, and 39 percent 
had university degrees, which is 2.6 percentage points more than in 2013. The Communist Party 
of China is overwhelmingly male, with only 21.7 million female members out of a total of 88 
million, about 25 percent. As for the occupations of the members, 26 million (30 percent) 
identify as working in agriculture, 7.3 million (8 percent) identify as workers, 12.5 million (14 
percent) identify as professionals, 9 million (10 percent) identify as administrative staff, and 7.4 
million (8 percent) identify as government workers. This leaves 25.8 million (29 percent) that do 
not identify with any of the above categories (South China Morning Post 2015). 
The Communist party of China’s mission is to be a “vanguard party,” which entails being 
comprised of the most capable and ideologically enlightened few of society (Xia, 2006). 
Towards that objective, the party admission process is long, rigorous, and selective. In 2014 the 
acceptance rate for party membership was the same as that of the Ivy League. Only 2 million 
were admitted to the party out of an applicant pool of 22 million (McMorrow, 2015). Selection 
for membership in the communist party is based on a broad range of criteria, including family 
background, academic performance, and party loyalty (Bian et al., 2001).  
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The party initiation process goes through several steps. The first step for a party hopeful 
is to compose a letter to the party organization affiliated with one’s school or work. In this letter, 
one must make a case for their membership. Successful letters include descriptions of academic 
success, offices held, and involvement in party-related activities. The letter should also portray 
one’s loyalty to the communist party and knowledge of party history. If, based on this letter, one 
is picked by the party organization to become an applicant, or “activist” according to party 
rhetoric, training begins (McMorrow, 2015). Successful activists frequently participate in 
political activities, including engaging in community service and attending lectures given by the 
local branch secretary. Activists are required to report regular “self-assessments,” and are also 
assessed by liaisons assigned by the party organization (Bian et al., 2001). Activists are assessed 
on their political loyalty, work or academic performance, social activities and personal 
relationships (Li et al., 2007). In addition, activists must attend a party class led by a professor of 
political thought. The curriculum includes the party’s history, structure and political purpose 
(McMorrow, 2015). This process continues for approximately 2 to 3 years (Li et al., 2007). Once 
the party determines the time has come for a final decision to be made regarding a particular 
activist’s transition into full membership, the final assessments take place. The activist must take 
a two-hour written examination on Marxism and Chinese Communist ideology, including that of 
Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. In addition, the local party organization interviews the 
activist’s peers and superiors to gain more insight into the activist’s personal quality and political 
character (McMorrow, 2015). A panel of party members also interviews the activist directly, 
inquiring about their political activities and quizzing them on their knowledge of recent party 
statements and events (McMorrow, 2015). This final decision making process culminates in a 
closed-door meeting where the local party organization tasks its members with judging political 
performance, personal history, and family background (Bian et al., 2001). This meeting ends in a 
vote on the activist’s admission into the party. If the party organization votes in favour of the 
applicant’s membership, that applicant is registered as a tentative party member, with full 
membership granted after a year of probation (Bian et al., 2001).6 
                                                 
6 During the probationary period, members participate in all party meetings and activities, but cannot vote on party initiatives or be considered for 
party positions (Bian et al., 2001). These party activities include meetings to study party documents or discuss national policies (McMorrow, 
2015). During the probationary period, members are closely monitored by the party organization. However, if a year passes and the member has 
not broken any party rules or engaged in any subversive activities, they become full members (Li et al., 2007).  
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Once admitted, one’s membership in the Communist Party of China acts as a foot in the 
door to becoming one of China’s administrative elite. Government positions and positions in 
state-run organizations with political or managerial authority are only open to party members. 
Access to positions at a certain level of hierarchy is controlled by authorities at the next higher 
level. Personnel offices of local party committees keep dossiers on all party members under their 
jurisdiction, recording successes and failures, and which are then consulted when examining a 
candidate for a position (Bian et al., 2001). 
B. Conceptual Framework 
First, it could be the case that once individuals become party members they learn useful 
skills via exposure to other members or learn valuable skills directly from other party members.7 
This channel is akin formal education being a form human capital: the distinction is that skill 
acquisition occur through other party members as opposed to formal schooling as it occurs in the 
human capital theory (Mincer, 1974; Willis, 1986).8  
Second, party membership increases one’s social capital by providing access to a social 
network that can yield valuable connections. These connections can then lead to referrals for 
jobs. The connections one gets through party membership can be considered a type of “bridging” 
social capital, which Zhang and Anderson (2014) determined leads to economic returns. Bian 
(1994) finds that party members are more likely to use social connections to find jobs than non-
members. Additionally, party membership yields higher status connections than those found 
outside the party, which leads to referrals for higher status jobs (Bian, 1994). The importance of 
social networks in labour markets is pervasive and well documented. Granovetter (1973, 1995) 
found in a survey of residents of a Massachusetts town that over 50 percent of jobs were 
obtained through social contacts. Earlier work by Rees (1966) found numbers of over 60 percent 
in a similar study. Exploration in a large number of studies documents similar figures for a 
variety of occupations, skill levels, and socioeconomic backgrounds.  
Third, party membership can translate into higher wages simply because of the fixed cost 
                                                 
7 The rigorous process of applying to and joining the party confers valuable transferrable skills in the Chinese labour market (Pan, 2010).  
8 Membership in the Communist party can also serve as a signal of one’s unobserved ability (Spence, 1974). Signals are important in hiring 
because the process of matching unemployed workers to suitable jobs with vacancies, and the bargaining process by which salaries are set are 
hindered by imperfect information (Yashiv, 2007). It is practically impossible for employers to assess how good a match might turn out to be 
because in addition to ability, job-specific productivity is also driven by personalities, fit with job culture, and other employee-specific 
preferences (Velasco, 2011). Signals like party membership can therefore, help employers to make hiring decisions. The Communist party 
attempts to attract the brightest and best of Chinese society, employers can take party membership as a signal for higher ability, which can lead to 
higher paying jobs. However, our survey sources do not provide direct information on one’s cognitive abilities.  
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to obtaining certain jobs -- some high paying jobs are only open to party members. Many 
employment opportunities in provincial and local governments are only open to party members 
(The Economist, 2014). In addition, all manager level jobs or higher in state-run organizations 
are only open to party members (Bian, 1994). Although our data does not enable us to 
disentangle the importance of each of these channels, all of these channels translate membership 
directly into better employment prospects either through the extensive margin (the likelihood of 
landing a job), through a better job match that results in higher wages or in higher wages. We 
return to providing suggestive evidence on the importance of each of these channels later.  
 
C. Towards More Causal Estimates of the Wage Premium of Party Membership 
Our paper builds on an empirical literature that attempts to measure the effect of party 
membership on earnings. One early study in this literature is Morduch & Sicular (2000), a study 
which attempts to estimate the effect of being a Communist party member on household income 
in rural China using an OLS approach. 9 Morduch & Sicular (2000) find that households with a 
cadre member exhibit approximately 20 percent higher earnings. However, they also fail to 
detect differences in household income between households with just one party member versus 
households with no party members. These results seem to suggest that monetary benefit to being 
a party member are conferred and mediated only through higher levels of Communist party 
involvement. Because of the study’s OLS-based research design, it cannot claim true causal 
effects of party membership.10 
Li et al. (2007) uses data from the Chinese Twins Survey, which relies on twins in five 
cities in China.  The study examines the effect of party membership on income within pairs of 
twins where one is a member and the other is not a member. They use twins to account for 
observable and unobservable differences that result in omitted variable bias in OLS-based 
                                                 
9 The study measured involvement in the CPC on two levels: 1) The household includes a party member and 2) the household includes a party 
cadre. A party cadre is someone who “holds an official position of political or administrative leadership” (Morduch & Sicular, 2000). Morduch & 
Sicular (2000) argue that in order for transition in a socialist country like China to succeed, rank-and-file officials (in the case of China, party 
cadres) need to have some incentive to administrate the changes of the transition even if it could have a negative effect on their political and 
economic status. Subsequently, one should expect to see positive household income effects on a household having a cadre member. 
10 Morduch & Sicular (2000) only examine rural China, where the networks and credentials that Communist party membership confers may have 
very little benefit because of a lack of employment opportunities. In addition, because they rely on OLS design, their estimation is likely plagued 
by omitted variable bias due party membership being related to ability or other time-variant individual specific characteristics that influence 
earnings. In contrast, in this paper we examine the effect of party membership in two of China’s major cities, Tianjin and Shanghai, where the 
benefits conferred by social and party networks and credentials are substantially higher. 
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observational data estimation. Their study estimates that the income of party members was 10 
percent higher than non-party members, but when accounting for “within-twin-pair fixed effects” 
to control for differences in ability and family background, the study detects no difference in 
income between party members and non-party members. 
Although twin models present some advantages (as highlighted above), they are also 
plagued with some important limitations as acknowledged by Griliches (1979) and Neumark 
(1999). For example, Neumark (1999) extends the analysis in Griliches (1979), and shows that 
the within-twin IV estimator amplifies the bias from any omitted ability differences between 
twins, relative to the standard within-twin estimator. Moreover, the paper clearly shows that if 
omitted ability biases cross-section estimates of the return to schooling upward, and is not fully 
removed by differencing within twin pairs, then the within-twin IV estimator is upward biased 
(possibly substantially) relative to the standard within-twin estimator, and possibly also relative 
to the cross-section estimator. This point is relevant for any application in which instrumental 
variables estimation is used for differenced data, when the differencing may not fully eliminate 
the omitted variable. Neumark (1999) remarks that the rationale for within-twin estimation of the 
return to schooling is the presumption that identical twins have equal ability, which drops out of 
the within-twin difference. However, this does not explain the source of schooling differences 
within twin pairs.  
The notion that within-twin estimates provide a “natural experiment” for estimating the 
return to schooling is based on the assumption that schooling differences within twin pairs 
represent random (true) variation. However, once alternative reasons for schooling differences 
among twins are considered (and if twins are identical, we must wonder about the source of 
schooling differences between them), the conditions for this experiment to be valid may be 
violated, and may, in some circumstances, imply that the bias in within-twin estimates is greater 
than that in cross-sectional estimates.  
The second important limitation of twin studies rests on an important assumption which 
some empirical paper contradict. For example, in the related empirical literature on the returns to 
schooling, twins-based estimates of the return to schooling have featured prominently. Their 
unbiasedness hinges critically on the assumption that within-pair variation in schooling is 
explained by factors unrelated to wage earning ability. Sandewall, Cesarini and Johanneson 
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(2014) develops a framework for testing this assumption and shows, in a large sample of 
monozygotic twins, that the twins-based estimated return to schooling falls if adolescent IQ test 
scores are included in the wage equation. Using birth weight as an alternative proxy for ability 
yields qualitatively similar results. The results of Sandewall, Cesarini and Johanneson (2014) 
thus cast strong doubts on the validity of twins-based estimates.11 The counterpart assumption in 
our context is that the unbiasedness in twin studies on the effect of communist party membership 
on earnings hinges critically on the assumption that within-pair variation in party membership is 
explained by factors unrelated to wage earning ability. Twin studies on the effect of party 
membership on earnings could be flawed because there is likely non-random variation in party 
membership correlated with ability differences of the twins.  
III. Data and Survey Sources 
A. Survey Data  
We draw on data from three major Chinese surveys that contain information on party 
membership, earnings and various labour market factors: the China Housing Survey, the Chinese 
Household and Income Project survey and the Chinese General Social Survey.  
 
The China Housing Survey (CHS). First, we use data from the China Housing Survey (CHS) 
carried out in 1993 in Tianjin and Shanghai.  This cross-sectional dataset was collected at the 
household level, and 2,096 households were interviewed in total. The neighbourhoods from 
which the households were drawn and the addresses of the households themselves were 
randomly selected. In addition, the survey was completed by randomly selecting and 
interviewing a respondent from within the household. The surveys were almost identical in each 
city, and were conducted simultaneously. In both cities, the surveys were authorized by the 
government, and the response rates were close to 100 percent. However, the sampling methods 
                                                 
11 In the context of educational attainment and estimating the returns to schooling, twin study designs have two strong downsides: (1) they can 
exacerbate measurement error (Light and Flores-Lagunes 2006; Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994, Behrman et al. 1994, Miller et al. 1995), and (2) 
Non-random variation in schooling correlated with ability differences of the twins – see Sandewall, Cesarini and Johannesson (2014). Both of these 
issues are very much potential threats to the validity of empirical estimates of party membership on earnings based on twin study designs.  
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differ slightly for Tianjin and Shanghai (Bian et al. 1999).12,13 The information collected of 
primary concern to this study was the wealth of demographic information, including ethnicity, 
gender, marriage status, education and neighbourhood.14  
 
The Chinese Household and Income Project Survey (CHIP). Our second survey source is the 
Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) a survey conducted between 1988 and 2013 of about 
8,000 rural households (representing some 35,000 individuals) and almost 7,000 urban 
households (approximately 22,000 members). To track the dynamics of income distribution in 
China, the CHIP conducted five waves of household surveys, in 1989, 1996, 2003, 2008 and 
2013 covering income and expenditure information.15 In this study, we use data from 1988 and 
2002. These surveys were carried out as part of a collaborative research project on incomes and 
inequality in China organized by Chinese and international researchers, with assistance from the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).  
The urban survey covered 10,000 households containing 29,262 individuals selected from 
302 cities in sixteen provinces, whereas the rural survey covered 13,000 households containing 
51,847 individuals selected from 287 counties in sixteen provinces. The migrant survey covered 
nearly 5,000 households containing 8,404 individuals selected from fifteen cities in nine 
provinces. To obtain a nationally representative sample, the provinces were selected from four 
distinct regions to reflect variations in economic development and geography.1617 
                                                 
12 In Tianjin, data collection was coordinated by the Tianjin academy of Social Science. Households from a randomly selected set of 125 
neighbourhoods were interviewed. One neighbourhood was chosen from each sub district of the city. The addresses for the households chosen 
were randomly selected from the Tianjin household registration system. The Tianjin surveys were incorporated into an annual Tianjin municipal 
government survey called the “One Thousand Household Survey.” In total, 1,042 households were surveyed in Tianjin. The sample from Tianjin 
is slightly biased towards male heads of households, but distributions on other characteristics are close to those of the general population in 
Tianjin as reported in the census (Bian et al., 1998). 
13 In Shanghai, data collection was coordinated by the Shanghai Academy of Social Science. Like in Tianjin, one neighbourhood from every sub 
district of the city was randomly selected, for a total of 110 neighbourhoods. The households interviewed were drawn from these 
neighbourhoods, and their addresses were randomly selected from the Shanghai census. In total, 1,054 households were surveyed in Shanghai. 
The distributions of the sample’s characteristics are close to those of the general population of Shanghai (Bian et al., 1998). 
14 Intended primarily as a housing survey, CHS elicited information on length of stay and frequency of moves, physical style of housing and 
organization of housing space, accessibility of utilities, amount of rent/payment and work unit subsidies, strategies for obtaining better housing, 
and neighbourhood support networks. Other items covered include job opportunity, collective welfare programs, employee training programs, 
and relationships with others in the work unit and with the work unit leader. Information was collected on up to 9 of the respondent’s household 
members, as well as the respondent’s spouse, parents and in-laws, regardless of whether they lived in the household. 
15 The CHIP survey was conducted in 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007 and 2013 respectively and called CHIP1988, CHIP1995, CHIP2002, CHIP2007, and 
CHIP2013.   
16 Beijing and Shanghai were selected to represent China’s large metropolitan cities; Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong to 
represent the eastern region; Shanxi, Anhui, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan to represent the central region; and Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, 
and Gansu to represent the western region. The provinces covered in the urban and rural surveys are almost identical, with the exception that 
Shanghai is only included in the urban survey and Hebei is only included in the rural survey. 
17 The data are derived from larger samples designed by China's State Statistics Bureau (SSB), but the questions about income are different from 
the SSB's surveys. Non‐response is rare although excluded from the urban sample are those without a formal certificate of residence (hukou), an 
increasingly serious omission over time as the size of this population grows. Individuals are asked to keep a record of their incomes and 
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A considerable amount of time was spent in verifying the accuracy of the data and in 
‘cleaning’ the data to eliminate measurement error. Essentially, this was affected by examining 
the sequence of income over the years for each individual and identifying unexpected or odd 
values. Sometimes these individuals were dropped from the sample. In other cases, it seemed 
reasonable to alter the recorded entry on income. This would occur when, for instance, zeros 
were missing in a single year. 
The two main advantages of the survey for our study are: the quality of the data on 
income, earnings and expenditures (i.e. earnings is our outcome variable) and plethora of 
information on one’s educational background, job networking, facets of one’s social network, 
management responsibilities and leadership roles. Data on these domains is useful in examining 
various mechanisms underpinning the relationship our paper examines.  
 
The Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS). Our third data source is the Chinese General 
Social Survey (CGSS). The CGSS’s main objective was to monitor systematically the changing 
relationship between social structure and quality of life in urban and rural China. The survey 
comprised urban households and 4,100 rural households in the 2003–6 Phase; the post-2006 
design was slightly modified to recognize the changes in community development in rural and 
urban areas. The large sample size was required to reach larger sample sizes (1) for each of five 
strata that account for regional and geo-administrative variations of China, and (2) to allow an 
attrition and replacement rate of 15 percent between adjacent years of surveys.18 
   We use data from two CGSS years: 2003 and 2013. These years are conducted after the 
years of the CHIP survey and the provide additional labour market information to gauge the 
channels between party membership and earnings.  
                                                 
expenditures and they are asked to consult their records before providing information on incomes in previous years. 
18 The distribution of sampling units was designed as follows: (1) a total of 125 primary sampling units (PSU) were selected for the national 
sample; (2) four secondary sampling units (SSU) are selected in each selected PSU; (3) two third-level sampling units (TSU) are selected in each 
selected SSU; and (4) ten households are selected in each selected TSU. One eligible person age eighteen or over (eighteen to sixty-nine for the 
2003 CGSS) was randomly selected from each sampled household to serve as the survey respondent. PSUs were county-level units. In official 
statistics, this refers to (a) counties (xian), (b) county-level cities (xian ji shi), and (c) city districts (qu) in cities whose administrative levels are 
prefecture or higher. Confined to the fifth population census, there are 2,801 PSUs from which 125 PSUs were selected by following these 
procedures: first, within each stratum, all PSUs are ranked according to the percentage of eligible respondents with a middle or higher educational 
level; and second, a given number of PSUs are selected by using a method of “proportionate to population size”; in this procedure, population 
refers to the civilian population ages eighteen to sixty-nine. 
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The CGSS survey offers our study three main advantages. First, the survey comprises 
very recent data on party membership, earnings and enables us to examine the same question as 
in the CHS and the CHIP surveys but with more recent data. Second, the CGSS survey collect 
data on parental party membership and so it provides us with an opportunity to apply an 
instrumental variable methodology using parental information as a potential instrument. Third, 
and perhaps the most important advantage of the survey relative to the previous two data sources, 
is the sub-sections that it covers from survey respondents on previous educational background, 
job attributes, overall happiness, job happiness, social network data and data on past job 
searches. Information on all of these variables is extremely helpful in examining potential 
mechanisms mediating the relationship between party membership and earnings.  
 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
[Figure 1 about here] [Table 1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 1-D, 1-E about here] 
Figure 1 reports data on the earnings distribution for the three surveys. Panel A reports 
the earnings distribution by party membership for CHIP 1988, Panel B reports the earnings 
distribution by party membership for CHS 1992, Panel C reports the earnings distribution by 
party membership for CHIP 2002, and the last two panels show the earnings distributions for 
CGSS 2003 and 2013. 
In Table 1, we further detail the earnings summary statistics by party affiliation and the 
breakdown of various socio-economic factors by party affiliation. In these surveys, Communist 
party members make up anywhere from almost 10 percent to slightly more than 20 percent in the 
five survey samples. Communist party members tend to be slightly older than the general 
sample, with an average age in the mid-50s, compared to the sample average of high 40s. 
Communist party members are also disproportionately male compared to the entire sample.  
Communist party members are more likely to be married and to have attained some deree of 
higher education (i.e., college or above). Finally, the average monthly earnings of non-members 
are lower than the earnings of party members. Table 1 clearly shows a positive relationship 
between party membership and earnings. 
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IV. Estimation Strategy 
A. Econometric Benchmark 1: Ordinary Least Squares 
In general, the goal of this paper is to estimate an equation of the form: 
 
1       ln	
 =  +  + ∑  +  +   +     
 
where (Earn)i represents monthly earnings, Ci, denotes if an individual is a member of the 
Communist party. ∑   is a set of demographic variables: educational level19, sex (whether 
or not a respondent is male), ethnicity (whether or not a respondent is of the Han majority), age 
(continuous definition), marital status (whether or not the respondent is married or not), religion 
(whether or not the respondent is religious or not), health (whether or not a respondent reports to 
be in poor health) and educational level attained. θi and δki in (1) capture respectively the 
individual-specific and the district fixed effects for individual i living in district k.20Empirically, 
we cannot identify θi with a cross-sectional dataset (all three of our surveys) as there is only a 
single observation per person.  
Our estimate of β1 in (1) will capture the difference in earnings between a party member 
and non-party member, assuming that party membership Ci is uncorrelated with other, 
unaccounted for factors that determine earnings. To gauge the magnitude and direction of the 
omitted variable bias, we can examine how β1 changes as we add each additional term in (1).  
 
B. Econometric Benchmark 2: Propensity Score Matching  
We augment the approach above with a propensity score matching method (Rosenbaum 
& Rubin 1983, 1984; Imbens 2004; Imbens & Wooldridge 2009; Imbens & Rubin 2014; Abadie 
et al. 2003; Angrist & Krueger 2000; Angrist & Pischke 2009). 
                                                 
19 The dataset does not capture continuous years of education. Instead, the survey asks each respondent to report one of the following categories: 
“No formal schooling,” “Elementary,”  “Junior high school,” “Senior high school,” “Technical school,” “Vocational school,” “3 year college,” 
“Formal college,” and “Graduate school.” 
20 The districts in the city of Tianjin included in the dataset are Hepin, Nankai, Hexi, Hedong, Hongxiang, Hebei, Tanggu, Hanggu, and Dagang. 
The districts in the city of Shanghai included in the dataset are Huangpu, Nanshi, Luwan, Xuhui, Changning, Jingan, Putou, Zhabei, Hongkou, 
Yangpu, Minhang and Baoshan. 
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First, we estimate a propensity score for each observation, the likelihood of one being a 
Communist party member: 
 
 2              =  +   


+    
 
where ∑    is a vector of time-invariant variables: sex (whether or not a respondent is male), 
ethnicity (whether or not a respondent is of the Han majority), marital status, religion (whether or 
not the respondent is religious), and education attainment level.21 The vector  ∑    does not 
include variables that may have been affected by the treatment of interest (Rosenbaum, 
1984; Frangakis & Rubin, 2002; Greenland, 2003).22 Based on the propensity score, we then 
match individuals who are party members with their counterfactual units who are non-party 
members. Specifically, we use a 1:1 matching with replacement although for robustness we 
report other matching methods as well. In its simplest form, 1:1 nearest neighbor matching 
selects for each treated individual i the control individual with the smallest distance from 
individual i. In the final step we estimate the effect of Communist party membership on wages 
using: 
3                 "
	
 =  + # +  


+  +   
For the estimation of (2), we use only observations on the common support.23 In the 
estimation procedure party members are matched with statistically similar (i.e., counterfactual) 
non-party members.  
As a result, subclassifying or matching on the propensity score makes it possible to 
estimate treatment effects, controlling for covariates, because within subclasses that are 
homogeneous in the propensity score, the distributions of the covariates are the same for treated 
and control units (e.g., are “balanced”). In particular, for a specific value of the propensity score, 
                                                 
21 Because educational levels are highly correlated with one’s age, we do not include respondent’s age though we estimate specifications with the 
age variable and the size of the key coefficient remains stable  
22 This is especially important when the covariates, treatment indicator, and outcomes are all collected at the same point in time, as is the case in 
our case. 
23 The common support ensures that persons with the same X values have a positive probability of being both participants and non-participants 
(Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). 
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the difference between the treated and control means for all units with that value of the 
propensity score is an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect at that propensity score, 
assuming the conditional independence between treatment assignment and potential outcomes 
given the observed covariates (“strongly ignorable treatment assignment” assumption) 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
 in specification (3) yields the average treatment effect of being a party member on 
one’s monthly earnings. This assumption means that the treated and non-treated are similar in 
their observable characteristics and that selection into treatment is on observables only i.e. that 
there are no unobservable differences between the two groups that correlate with wages. Our 
matching approach and the various matching algorithms indeed capture all the relevant 
observable differences between those who are and are not in the Communist party. We address 
the identifying assumption below in the next two sections. 
  
V. Results: The Wage Premium of Party Membership 
A. Ordinary Least Squares  
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 reports the results from the OLS-based specification (1). The estimated 
coefficient is based on a regression with a full set of controls including regional fixed effects. 
The estimated earnings return to party membership ranged from 7.5 percent to almost 25 percent. 
Two facts merit attention. First, all of the estimated effect size on the communist party variable 
are highly statistically significant (at the 1-percent level). Second, the effect size based on these 
three survey sources seems to be increasing over the span of almost three decades. The estimated 
coefficient based on the CHIP 1988 survey is a 7.5 percent, implying that all else equal, being a 
party member increases one’s earnings by 7.5 percent. The associated effect size but based on 
the CGSS 2013 sample is almost triple in size or 25 percent (statistically significant at the 1-
percent). However, this empirical estimation is likely plagued from omitted variable bias (i.e., 
upward biased) and this is a concern we attempt to address below.  
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B. Propensity Score Matching Results 
To the extent party selection occurs (an issue we address below) on observable 
characteristics, we can also estimate the wage premium associated with being a Communist party 
member using the propensity score approach. Before we present the results based on this 
econometric approach, we provide analyses on the identifying assumptions.  
 
Common Support Assumption and Post-Matching Balancing. First, we test whether the 
common support assumption is fulfilled (Kahn and Tamer, 2010).24 The substance of the 
common support assumption is that there must be both treated and untreated observations with 
each value of X.25 The assumption essentially ensures that persons with the same X values have 
a positive probability of being both participants and non-participants (Heckman, LaLonde, and 
Smith, 1999). We examine graphically if the common support assumption holds in the five data 
samples. Figure 2 (and Appendix A Figure A.1) report the results.  
   
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
It is easy to discern, based on Figure 2, that in each class of the “propensity score“ a 
certain number of “non-treated” individuals exist as well. Figure 3 displays the estimated density 
of the predicted probabilities that a communist party member is a non-member.26 Based on 
Busso, DiNardo, and McCrary (2014) neither plot indicates too much probability mass near 0 or 
1, and the two estimated densities have most of their respective masses in regions in which they 
overlap each other. Thus, there is no evidence that the overlap assumption is violated. Therefore, 
there is no visual evidence that the common support assumption is violated in these five data 
samples. To confirm the graphical test, we also perform a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test (to 
test the equality of two distributions). The K-S test does not reject the null hypothesis of equality 
of distributions between groups after matching. 
                                                 
24 The standard common support assumption is: 0 < Pr(D=1|X) < 1. The strict common support assumption is 0 < c < Pr(D=1|X) < 1-c < 1. 
25 When estimating the ATET, all that is required is untreated units for each value of X corresponding to at least one treated unit. 
26 Appendix A Figure A.1 reports the proportion of propensity scores by treatment status and it clearly shows an overlap between the distribution 
of propensity scores between treated and untreated units.  
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Next, we examine the balancing of covariates based on the propensity score matching 
exercise. Before we explore the effect of party membership on earnings, we examine balancing 
after the propensity matching has occurred.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Related to the so-called conditional independence assumption, we assess the quality of 
matching after performing tests that check whether the propensity score adequately balances 
characteristics between the treatment and comparison group units. The objective of these tests is 
to verify that treatment is independent of unit characteristics after conditioning on observed 
characteristics (as estimated in the propensity score model).27 It is important to note that only 
“after-matching” tests compare differences in time-invariant covariates (that are unaffected by 
treatment) for the resulting matched sample. 
Figure 3 and Online Appendix A Table A.1  report the results of after-matching balancing. 
Figure 3 displays the overall balancing, based on the propensity score, for treated and untreated 
units. We examine graphically and with comparison of means to ensure that any differences in 
the covariate means between the two groups in the matched sample have been eliminated, which 
improves the likelihood of unbiased treatment effects. Appendix A Table A.1 reports the 
balancing post matching for each of the five datasets: CHIP 1988 is reported in Online Appendix 
A Table A.1-1, CHS 1993 is reported in Online Appendix A Table A.1-2, CHIP 2002 is reported 
in Online Appendix A Table A.1-3, CGSS 2003 is reported in Online Appendix A Table A.1-4, 
and CGSS 2013 is reported in Online Appendix A Table A.1-5. The tables also report a formal 
test for whether the matching is fulfilled by performing a formal for equality of means in the 
post-matching sample comparing the means between treated (i.e. communist party members) 
versus non-treated (non-party members). These formal tests reveal successful matching based on 
the chosen covariates. Furthermore, based on Imai and Ratkovic (2014), we conducted another 
formal balancing test for balancing of covariate means between treatment and control units 
                                                 
27 Formally, this assumption entails T⊥X | p(X), where X is the set of characteristics that are believed to satisfy the conditional independence 
assumption. In other words, after conditioning on p(X), there should be no other variable that could be added to the conditioning set of the 
propensity score models that would improve the estimation, and after the application of matching, there should be no statistically significant 
differences between covariate means of the treatment and comparison units. 
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(reported in Online Appendix A Table A.2).28 The test fails to reject the null-hypothesis that the 
propensity score model is balanced based on the chosen covariate to predict party membership. 
Average Treatment Effects. We estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) by propensity-
score matching (PSM) based on a nearest neighbor 2:1 matching with replacement. PSM 
estimators impute the missing potential outcome for each subject by using an average of the 
outcomes of similar subjects that receive the other treatment level. Matching with replacement can 
often decrease bias because controls that look similar to many treated individuals can be used 
multiple times. This is particularly helpful in settings where there are few control individuals 
comparable to the treated individuals (e.g., Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). Additionally, when 
matching with replacement the order in which the treated individuals are matched does not matter. 
We return to the issue of the algorithm matching procedure and the robustness of the estimated 
effect size to the chosen algorithm choice in the next section.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 reports the results from the propensity score matching method based on specification 
(3).29  The estimated effect sizes deserve several highlights. First, the estimated effect size range 
from approximately 18 percent based on the 1988 sample to 21 percent based on the CGSS sample. 
The CHS effect size is noticeably smaller although the CHS samples includes observations only 
in two specific urban areas (i.e., Tianjin and Shanghai), whereas the CHIP and CGSS samples 
include both urban and rural observations.30 Second, the estimated effect size based on the 
matching procedure are generally lower compared to the effect size based on the OLS estimation. 
The decrease in the estimated effect size based on matching suggests that the matching procedure 
likely addresses additional positive selection that takes place in the party initiation process. We 
return, in Section 6, to the issue of how sensitive  the effect size estimates are to the chosen 
matching algorithm used and the issue of potential additional bias based on the unobservable 
                                                 
28 Imai and Ratkovic (2014) derive a test for whether the estimated propensity score balances the covariates. The score equations for parameters of 
the propensity-score model define an exactly identified generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. Imai and Ratkovic (2014) use the 
conditions imposed by mean balance as over-identifying conditions. A standard GMM test for the validity of the over-identifying conditions is then 
a test for covariate balance. 
29 The PSM estimation was done using teffects in Stata 15. 
30 In analysis we do not report, we compare estimates from the same two regions in CGSS and the benchmark analysis shows extremely similar 
results.  
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characteristics. Third, the reported effect size estimates show some evidence of an increase in the 
estimated wage premium associated with party membership.  
 
C. Heterogeneous Treatment Analysis 
Using the propensity score-based estimation, we examine how the treatment effect of party 
membership on earnings differ by important individual covariates. In particular, we focus on 
gender, education, ethnicity and whether a parent is a member of the Communist Party. To 
estimate the heterogeneous impact, we augment specification (3):  
 
(4)            "
	
 =  + # + ∑ # ×  +  +   
 
Xi   captures covariates for which we test for treatment effect heterogeneity. Table 4 presents the 
combined effects (on the binary variable and the interaction).31 We detect statistically significant 
differences for the Han ethnicity population. In terms of gender, we detect slightly larger effect 
sizes for women throughout the years our data allows to analyze. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
D. Mechanisms  
Next, we assess the relative importance of various channels in explaining the linkage 
between party membership and better wage outcomes. Party membership could change several 
aspects of daily life that could potentially contribute to the observed wage effects. In particular, it 
could improve the strength or the quality of one’s social network, which could in turn confer 
various labour market benefits for one: reduce the job search time, provide information about 
available job opportunities, provide information on better-paying jobs. Party membership itself 
could also spur one’s interest in getting better job qualifications (or certifications), which could 
carry intrinsic productivity benefits due to better knowledge acquisition or because they are 
                                                 
31 Conceptually the main difference between subgroup analysis and interaction terms is that stratified regressions allow all regression coefficients 
to vary across sub-groups; the difference between subgroup analysis and interaction term based regressions in practice will depend on number of 
control variables, and the assumption that control variables are orthogonal to the treatment.  
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explicitly valued and rewarded by employers. Third, party membership could confer access to 
better paying type of jobs. Fourth, party membership or better social capital could be an 
important determinant of one’s overall well-being (Yip et al., 2007). Therefore, it seems likely 
that behavioural adjustments are (partly) responsible for the positive wage effects reported in the 
previous section. We investigate these mechanisms further with additional data on some of these 
potential channels.  
We use the panel feature of the 2002 CHIP survey, which provides additional annual 
information on earnings and on potential mediating variables that could shed light of 
mechanisms underlying the relationship between party affiliation and one’s wages. Based on the 
available data from the two survey sample, we explore for four main channels: strength of one’s 
social network, human capital acquisition as one becomes a party member, improvement in one’s 
social rank and overall life satisfaction. Specifically, the 2002 CHIP (the urban questionnaire) 
provides survey information on whether one holds a government job, how many friends one can 
rely on for finding a job, whether one has a professional title, months to find a new job, 
happiness level, and self-perceived social rank. Table 5 reports the results.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Column 1 reports the main results from Table 3. The remaining columns add the specific 
channel variables one at a time, and the last column (in Table 5) controls for all channel variables 
in the regression. In the final row, we only include the variables that are statistically significant 
in individual variable specifications and that do not entail a lot of missing observations. In the 
final regression in Table 5 (for CHIP 2002), we see strong evidence that the strongest impact on 
wage seems to be through an improvement the likelihood of one holding a government job, 
improvement in one’s position within one’s job hierarchy, and improvement in one’s overall 
social rank. Although we see a positive effect size on the happiness variable, the variable is not 
statistically significant in the final specification. Of course, the evidence presented in Table 5 is 
only suggestive and relies on the assumption that the changes in the channel variables presented 
increase wage. Methodological problems and data limitations make it difficult to conduct a 
formal mediation analysis. Nevertheless, it does provide suggestive evidence that three important 
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channels likely exert strong influence on one’s wages: access to a subset of government jobs, the 
acquisition of additional job-related qualifications, and an overall improvement in one’s social 
rank.  
VI. Robustness Checks 
A. Matching Algorithm Method 
We examine robustness of the estimated effect sizes for the five data samples with respect 
to the matching algorithm method. In addition to the main matching results (which are based on 
the nearest neighbor 2:1 matching with replacement method), we further re-estimate the effect 
sizes using the nearest neighbour matching (NN), the caliper method, the kernel method, and the 
IPW matching method. The most straightforward matching estimator is nearest neighbour (NN) 
matching. The individual from the comparison group is chosen as a matching partner for a 
treated individual that is closest in terms of propensity score. Several variants of NN matching 
are possible, e.g. NN matching “with replacement” and “without replacement”. In the former 
case, an untreated individual can be used more than once as a match, whereas in the latter case it 
is considered only once. Matching with replacement involves a trade-off between bias and 
variance. NN matching faces the risk of bad matches, if the closest neighbour is far away. This 
can be avoided by imposing a tolerance level on the maximum propensity score distance (i.e., 
caliper matching). Imposing a caliper works in the same direction as allowing for replacement. 
Bad matches are avoided and hence the matching quality rises. The idea of stratification 
matching is to partition the common support of the propensity score into a set of intervals (strata) 
and to calculate the impact within each interval by taking the mean difference in outcomes 
between treated and control observations (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). We use five subclasses, 
purported to remove 90 percent of the bias due to measured confounders, have been used by the 
majority of propensity score studies (Thoemmes & Kim 2010) based on Cochran (1968) and 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984). 
Kernel matching (KM) and local linear matching (LLM) are non-parametric matching 
estimators that use weighted averages of all individuals in the control group to construct the 
counterfactual outcome. Thus, one major advantage of these approaches is the lower variance 
which is achieved because more information is used. Imbens (2004) notes that propensity scores 
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can also be used as weights to obtain a balanced sample of treated and untreated individuals 
(IPW method). If the propensity score is known, the estimator can directly be implemented as the 
difference between a weighted average of the outcomes for the treated and untreated individuals. 
In Online Appendix B Tables B.2, we present estimates from the algorithm matching 
techniques outlined above. The results in the table show that the effect size estimates are fairly 
robust to the choice of algorithm matching technique – estimates range from 8.25 to 9.24 percent 
higher wage premium for communist party membership. Only the radius caliper (0.2) matching 
for CGSS 2013 yields a slightly lower premium.32 33 
 
B. Two-Stage Least Squares Method  
We also augment our matching procedure results with a two-stage least squares 
estimation (2SLS), in which we instrument one’s party affiliation with one’s parental party 
affiliation. A valid instrument, such as parental party membership, for one’s party affiliation 
must shift one’s party affiliation but affect one’s monthly earnings only through one’s own party 
membership. Although this estimation approach is a promising alternative with several 
advantages to the matching procedure, only a subset of the datasets we use have data on parental 
party affiliation and even for these datasets, data on parental affiliation is missing for a very large 
number of the observations. Based on the two datasets (CHIP 2002 and CGSS 2013), we re-
estimate the wage premium associated with party premium with the limited data we have on 
parental party affiliation in these two data samples.  
Appendix A.3 reports the results for the estimated wage premium. Appendix A.3, 
Column (1) reports the estimated effect size for the CHIP 2002 dataset and the estimated effect 
size is a 17 percent increase (imprecisely estimated) in monthly earnings associated with 
Communist party membership. Appendix A.3, Column (2) reports the estimated effect size for 
the CGSS 2002 dataset and the estimated effect size is a 27 percent increase in monthly earnings 
                                                 
32 We also explore the stability of the results for the NN matching technique by the number of propensity influencing variables (not reported and 
available upon request). To satisfy the assumption of ignorable treatment assignment, it is important to include in the matching procedure all 
variables known to be related to both treatment assignment and the outcome (Rubin and Thomas, 1996; Heckman et al., 1998; Glazerman et al., 
2003; Hill et al., 2004). We explore adding five to fifteen additional variables and examine how the treatment effects change. The results are 
stabile to the inclusion of additional matching variables. 
33 We explore in Online Appendix Tables B.1-1 through B.1-5 how treatment varies by the probability of selection into treatment based on Xie, 
Brand, and Jann (2012). In Online Appendix Table B.1-1 to B-1.5, we examine variation in the effect size by the treatment probability. We detect 
very small differences by propensity score strata. The results regarding the relationship between party membership and monthly earnings are 
stable and most differences are statistically insignificant. 
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(imprecisely estimated) associated with Communist party membership. Although both estimates 
of the wage premium coefficient are not statistically significant, they are comparable to the 
results based on the matching procedure. The CGSS 2013 based on the 2SLS is slightly higher 
than the effect size based on the matching, which could be due to the fact that the instrument 
cleanses some measurement error in the outcome variable and/or because the 2SLS estimate is 
based on a very different subset of the sample population,  the-so called group of compliers 
(Angrist and Krueger, 1999), which could be the subset of individuals with higher marginal 
return to party membership to begin with.  
 
C. Quantile Regressions  
We also estimate (reported in Online Appendix B Tables B.3) the effect of party 
membership by estimating an equation expressing each quantile of the conditional distribution.  
In this type of estimation, we allow for effects of the independent variables to differ over the 
quantiles. We estimate the propensity score method for each quantile – 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75. 
Using these specifications, we find that for individuals who earn less (i.e., 0.25 quantile), the 
effect of party membership on earnings is particularly pronounced. We cannot detect strong 
effects for individuals when we restrict our attention to the 0.50 and 0.75 quantiles. We also 
graph (in Online Appendix A Figure A.2) the estimates coefficients for the effect of being a 
communist party member on wages for each quantile regression based on Koenker and Basset 
(1978) with quantile increments of 0.05. 
 
D. Rosenbaum Bounds 
The estimation of treatment effects relies on the matching estimators is based on the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA), i.e. selection on observable characteristics. If there 
are unobserved variables which affect assignment into treatment and the outcome variable 
simultaneously, a hidden bias might arise. In this section, we explore how sensitive the treatment 
effect is if inference about treatment effects is altered by unobserved factors. We examine how 
strongly an unmeasured variable must influence the selection process in order to undermine the 
implications of matching analysis presented. Rosenbaum (2002) has developed a method of 
sensitivity analysis to assess if one’s estimated based on matching is robust to the possible 
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presence of an unobserved confounder. This sensitivity analysis for matched data provides a 
specific statement about the magnitude of hidden bias that would need to be present to explain 
the associations actually observed (Rosenbaum, 2002).  
We estimate the Rosenbaum bounds based on the main estimation matching technique. 
The results are reported in Online Appendix B Tables B.4-1 through B.4-5. Γ is a measure of the 
degree of departure from a study that is free of bias. Overall the lowest critical value for Γ 
(gamma) ranges from 1 to 10 and varies between the Hodges-Lehmann point estimate and the 95 
percent confidence interval.34 Gamma captures the log odds of differential assignment due to 
unobserved factors. In other words, gamma allows us to examine if we introduce differential 
likelihood for assignment into treatment group, how the treatment effect will change. We find 
that the lowest critical value that (barely) includes zero ranges from 2.00 to 5.00 (Hodges-
Lehmann point estimate). Such a high H-L critical value constitutes strong evidence that our 
estimated positive effects of the effect of communist party membership on wages are robust to 
even small amount of bias based on selection on unobservables. 
VII. Conclusions 
One million Chinese citizens join the Communist party of China every year, and over 80 
percent of graduating college students apply. Membership in the party is perceived as an 
investment in political capital that can help one get a better job and higher salaries. In this paper, 
we estimate the wage premium of membership in the Chinese Communist party using data from 
over three decades.  
We report three main findings. First, using a propensity score matching technique, we 
find that Communist party members, on average, earn approximately a little over 20 percent 
more in monthly earnings compared to non-members. This estimated effect is larger than 
previous estimates summarized in Li et al. (2007) – our estimates are based on sample from both 
rural and urban areas in China, whereas previous studies rely on data predominantly from urban 
areas. This finding adds to previous research using data from developing countries that shows 
substantial monetary benefits associated with political status and social connections (Siddique, 
2010; Madheswaram and Attewell, 2007; Das and Dutta, 2007). To bolster the credibility of our 
                                                 
34 See Hollander and Wolfe (2013) for more details on the Hodges-Lehmman point estimate for the sign rank test. 
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estimates, we examine the robustness of the results with respect to various factors: the matching 
algorithm method, the estimation technique and potential selection bias due to unobservable 
characteristics. Second, because we rely on data over three decades, we find suggestive evidence 
that this wage premium has grown modestly over the last three decades. In both the ordinary 
least squares and propensity score matching results, we detect evidence that the wage premium 
has increased. Finally, we explore for the relative importance of various channels in explaining 
the linkage between party membership and better wage outcomes. Based on the available data 
from the two data samples, we explore for four main channels: strength of one’s social network, 
human capital acquisition as one becomes a party member, improvement in one’s social rank and 
overall life satisfaction. We provide suggestive evidence that at least three important channels 
likely exert very strong positive influence on one’s wages when one joins the Communist Party: 
better access to government jobs, improvement in one’s position within one’s job hierarchy, and 
an overall improvement in one’s social rank.  
All of the findings provide robust evidence that political connections can play an 
important economic role in the world's most populous economy. The results in this paper also 
shed new light one reason that helps explain why the communist party membership has more 
than doubled since the early 1980s and is likely to continue to do so in future years. 
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Figures 
 
Panel A: CHIP 1988 Panel B: CHS 1993 
  
Panel C: CHIP 2002 Panel D: CGSS 2003 
 
 
Panel E: CGSS 2013  
 
 
FIGURE 1 Distribution of Logged Monthly Earnings (in RMB), By Survey Source 
Note: Distribution for each value of the party membership variable (1=Communist party member; 0=non-
member) 
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Panel A: CHIP 1988 Panel B: CHS 1993 
  
Panel C: CHIP 2002 Panel D: CGSS 2003 
 
 
Panel E: CGSS 2013  
 
 
FIGURE 2 Density of the Predicted Probability 
Note: Shows density distributions of participants and non-participants, and the region of common support; X-axis: high 
probability of participating given X 
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Panel A: CHIP 1988 Panel B: CHS 1993 
  
Panel C: CHIP 2002 Panel D: CGSS 2003 
  
Panel E: CGSS 2013  
 
 
FIGURE 3 Balancing Post Propensity Score Matching 
Note: Distribution for each value of the party membership variable (1=Communist party member; 0=non-
member) 
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Tables 
 
TABLE 1-A Descriptive Statistics (CHIP 1988)  
   Sample 
Non-Communist 
Party Members 
Communist 
Party Members 
 
   (1) (2) (3)  
Monthly Earnings (in Rmbs) 
 
 87.41 
(57.73) 
82.01  
(58.46) 
105.31  
(51.91) 
 
Member in the Communist 
party (percent)   
12.50% 0% 100%  
Han (percent)   94.00% 93.87% 94.89%  
Male (percent)   49.69% 46.85% 79.43%  
Age 
  
39.80 
(51.71) 
37.04 
(37.92) 
47.36 
(42.19) 
 
Education Level Primary   5.44% 6.27% 1.79%  
 Middle School   13.26% 14.54% 7.69%  
 High School  35.45% 37.51% 26.41%  
 Technical School  21.28% 21.81% 18.91%  
 Vocational School  2.86% 3.17% 1.54%  
 Collegea  7.40% 6.27% 12.31%  
Occupation Private Sector  1.00% 1.12% 0.99%  
 Professional  4.89% 4.32% 15.21%   
Managerial  3.18% 1.28% 20.41%   
Office  7.03% 5.71% 25.46%  
 Low-skill  18.33% 22.65% 11.80%  
 Agricultural  44.14% 55.06% 17.94%  
 Temporary  1.24% 1.58% 0.00%  
Observations   60,897 45,338 6,476  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. aCollege combines individuals who reported having attained college-level education and 
graduate school. 
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TABLE 1-B  Descriptive Statistics (CHS 1993)  
   Sample 
Non-Communist 
Party Members 
Communist 
Party Members 
 
   (1) (2) (3)  
Monthly Earnings (in Rmbs) 
 
 307.77 
(155.093) 
298.59 
(157.93) 
346.21 
(136.24) 
 
Member in the Communist 
party (percent)   
18.61% 0% 100% 
 
Han (percent)   98.47% 98.53% 98.21%  
Male (percent)   60.31% 56.15% 78.46%  
Age 
  
47.39  
(13.76) 
46.50  
(14.03) 
51.27  
(11.79) 
 
Religious (percent)   4.3% 4.76% 2.31%  
Married (percent)   86.07% 84.76% 91.79%  
In Poor Health (percent)   10.16% 9.96% 11.03%  
Education Level Elementary  5.44% 6.27% 1.79%  
 No schooling  13.26% 14.54% 7.69%  
 Elementary  35.45% 37.51% 26.41%  
 Middle School  21.28% 21.81% 18.91%  
 High School  2.86% 3.17% 1.54%  
 Technical School  7.40% 6.27% 12.31%  
 Vocational School  8.78% 6.39% 19.23%  
 Three-year College  5.34% 3.93% 11.54%   
Formal College  0.14% 0.12% 0.26%   
Graduate School  5.44% 6.27% 1.79%  
Observations   2,096 1,621 390  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
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TABLE 1-C Descriptive Statistics (CHIP 2002)  
   Sample 
Non-Communist 
Party Members 
Communist Party 
Members 
 
   (1) (2) (3)  
Monthly Earnings (in Rmbs) 
 
 593.98 
(562.07) 
525.09 
(527.99) 
835.22 
(610.77) 
 
Member in the Communist party 
(percent)   
20.40% 0% 100%  
Han (percent)   94.00% 93.87% 94.89%  
Male (percent)   49.69% 46.85% 79.43%  
Age 
  
39.80 
(51.71) 
37.04 
(37.92) 
47.36 
(42.19) 
 
Married (percent)   76.61% 72.46% 94.50%  
Education Level Primary   18.34% 19.47% 10.17%  
 Middle School   54.71% 56.12% 44.95%  
 High School  14.01% 12.06% 27.92%  
 Technical School  5.04% 4.49% 8.91%  
 Vocational School  1.46% 1.13% 3.86%  
 Collegea  0.28% 0.22% 0.71%  
Occupation Private Sector  3.83% 4.26% 2.25%  
 Professional  8.45% 7.22% 13.21%   
Managerial  4.47% 1.63% 15.68%   
Office  9.91% 6.76% 22.33%  
 Low-skill  8.38% 9.06% 5.93%  
 Agricultural  9.45% 11.17% 3.09%  
 Temporary  7.14% 8.09% 3.75%  
Observations   60,897 45,338 6,476  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. aCollege combines individuals who reported having attained college-level education and graduate 
school. 
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TABLE 1-D Descriptive Statistics (CGSS 2003)  
   Sample 
Non-Communist 
Party Members 
Communist 
Party Members 
 
   (1) (2) (3)  
Monthly Earnings (in 
Rmbs)  
 941.60 
(298.40) 
917.31 
(1,080.23) 
1,294.82 
(1,093.38) 
 
Member in the 
Communist party 
(percent)   
6.44% 0% 100%  
Han (percent)   94.43% 94.46% 94.12%  
Male (percent)   53.57% 54.07% 46.37%  
Age 
  
44.62 
(12.69) 
44.13 
(12.62) 
51.74 
(11.47) 
 
Married (percent)   84.97% 84.27% 95.16%  
Education Level Primary   12.78% 13.21% 6.57%  
 Middle School   30.55% 31.75% 13.15%  
 High School  18.70% 18.87% 16.26%  
 Technical School  10.00% 9.54% 16.61%  
 Vocational School  3.14% 3.31% 0.69%  
 College  6.80% 5.93% 19.38%  
 Graduate School  0.49% 0.48% 0.69%  
Observations   4,491 4,202 289  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
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TABLE 1-E Descriptive Statistics (CGSS 2013)  
   Sample 
Non-Communist 
Party Members 
Communist 
Party Members 
 
   (1) (2) (3)  
Monthly Earnings (in Rmbs) 
 
 2,240.94 
(3,165.13) 
2,082.62 
(2,818.19) 
3,437.46 
(4,909.80) 
 
Member in the Communist party 
(percent)   
11.69% 0% 100%  
Han (percent)   91.35% 91.25% 92.08%  
Male (percent)   54.58% 51.92% 74.72%  
Age 
  
49.40 
(15.72) 
48.88 
(15.57) 
53.26 
(16.29) 
 
Married (percent)   78.82% 78.23% 83.30%  
Education Level Primary   21.63% 23.27% 9.25%  
 Middle School   30.00% 31.36% 19.72%  
 High School  11.52% 11.31% 13.11%  
 Technical School  2.28% 2.37% 16.04%  
 Vocational School  5.27% 4.81% 8.77%  
 College  7.22% 5.31% 21.70%  
 Graduate School  0.68% 0.46% 2.36%  
Observations   9,071 8,011 1,060  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
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TABLE 2 Earnings Equation (OLS) 
Dependent Variable:  
 ln (Monthly Earnings),  
(in RMBs) 
 
     
Survey Source /Year  
CHIP 
1988a 
CHS  
1993b 
CHIP  
2002c 
CGSS  
2003d 
CGSS  
2013e 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Communist Party 
Membership  
0.075*** 
(0.006) 
0.134*** 
(0.035) 
0.163*** 
(0.023) 
0.171*** 
(0.047) 
0.253*** 
(0.032) 
 
        
District Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES  
R-squared   0.369 0.359 0.3244 0.3118 0.4272  
Observations  19,323 1,994 11,817 4,491 9,071  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. a in this specification, the control variables are educational level, ethnicity, 
gender, age, age-sq, urbanicity, religious status, marital status, health status;b in this specification, the control variables 
are educational level, ethnicity, gender, age, age-sq, urbanicity;c in this specification, the control variables are 
educational level, ethnicity, gender, age, age-sq, urbanicity, marital status, health status.d in this specification, the 
control variables are educational level, ethnicity, gender, age, age-sq, urbanicity, marital status, health status; e in this 
specification, the control variables are educational level, ethnicity, gender, age, age-sq, urbanicity, marital status, health 
status. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
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TABLE 3 Earnings Equation (Propensity Score Matching Estimation) 
Dependent Variable:  
 ln (Monthly Earnings),  
(in RMBs) 
 
     
Survey Source /Year  
CHIP 
1988a 
CHS  
1993b 
CHIP  
2002c 
CGSS  
2003d 
CGSS  
2013e 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Communist Party 
Membership  
0.177***   
(0.010) 
0.094*** 
(0.024) 
0.188**   
(0.022) 
0.233***   
(0.032) 
0.212*** 
(0.052) 
 
        
District Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES  
R-squared  0.369 0.359 0.401 0.3118 0.4272  
Observations  19,323 1,994 11,817 4,491 9,071  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. a in this specification, the control variables are educational level, ethnicity, gender, 
age, age-sq, urbanicity, religious status, marital status, health status;b Variables used in estimating propensity score: sex 
dummy (1 if respondent is male and 0 if female), ethnicity dummy (1 if respondent is of the Han majority ethnicity and 0 
if of a minority ethnicity), married dummy (1 if the respondent is married and 0 if single), dummies for education (1 if 
the respondent achieved the specified level of education and 0 if not) and religion (1 if the respondent is religious and 0 if 
town). Values can be interpreted as the percent change in monthly earnings. Communist party membership in a dummy 
equal to 1 if the subject is a member of the Communist party and 0 if otherwise; c in this specification, the control 
variables are educational level, ethnicity, gender, age, age-sq, urbanicity, marital status, health status.d in this 
specification, the control variables are educational level, ethnicity, gender, age, age-sq, urbanicity, marital status, health 
status; e in this specification, the control variables are educational level, ethnicity, gender, age, age-sq, urbanicity, marital 
status, health status. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 Heterogeneous Treatment Analysis 
Socio-economic Group  ln (Monthly Earnings, in RMBs) 
  CHIP 1988 CHS 1993 CHIP 2003 CGSS 2003 CGSS 2013 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gender Male 
0.161*** 
(0.010) 
0.124***  
(0.029) 
0.197*** 
(0.027) 
0.211*** 
(0.035) 
0.106**  
(0.05) 
Education College Degree 
0.142*** 
(0.020) 
-0.075  
(0.078) 
0.082*** 
(0.054) 
-0.114  
(0.102) 
-0.025  
(0.065) 
Ethnicity Han Ethnicity 
0.181*** 
(0.011) 
0.093***  
(0.024) 
0.184*** 
(0.022) 
0.226*** 
(0.033) 
0.200*** 
(0.055) 
Parent Communist 
Parental 
Communist 
Party Member 
Status 
NA 
-0.020  
(0.065) 
0.134*** 
(0.038) 
NA NA 
       
Estimation Strategy  PSM PSM PSM PSM PSM 
       
Observations  19,323 1,994 24,704 4,491 9,071 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 Mechanisms of Party Influence on Earnings (CHIP 2002a) 
Variables Dependent Variable: ln (Monthly Earnings),  (in RMBs) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)h 
CPMa 
0.188**   
(0.022) 
0.152 
(0.120) 
0.167 
(0.119) 
0.185 
(0.119) 
0.210* 
0.120 
0.210* 
0.120 
0.237*** 
(0.096) 
0.244** 
(0.096)) 
0.079 
(0.120) 
Holds a government job 
(1=yes) 
 
0.067*** 
(0.027) 
      
0.599* 
(0.155) 
Higher professional title 
(1=yes)c 
  
0.471*** 
(0.167) 
     
0.324* 
(0.170) 
Friends who can help one find a 
job? (#)d 
   
0.007 
(0.023) 
     
Holds a management position     
1.225 
(0.852) 
    
Months to find a job? (#)e      
0.004 
(0.027) 
   
Happiness levelf       
0.215*** 
(0.049) 
 
0.085 
(0.061) 
Self-perceived social rankg        
0.490*** 
(0.065) 
0.336*** 
(0.084) 
          
Observations 5,825 4,115 4,140 4,140 4,114 222 5,768 5,811 1,961 
Notes: (a) For this analysis we only use the urban sub-sample of CHIP 2002 because the survey questions on these potential mechanisms are only available in 
the urban survey questionnaire. (b) CPM=Communist Party Member. (c) Professional title and administrative rank of professionals and cadres of government 
agents, institutions and enterprises. Coded as 1 if individual reported having a senior title, being a bureau chief level and above, or division chief level and 
above, or section chief level and above. (d) The survey question was “If you want to change your job, how many friends and relatives can you ask to help 
you?” Robust standard errors in parentheses. (e) variable is not included in the final regression in column (6) because of very high number of missing 
observations that results in a very small sample size for that specification. (f) Happiness level is five levels and, in our regressions, the higher value indicates 
happier individual. The levels are: very happy, happy, so-so, not very happy, not happy at all. (g) self-perceived social rank based on living standards. Higher 
values indicate increase in social rank. The actual categories are: bottom quartile, second lowest quartile, second best quartile, and top quartile. (h) in this 
specification, we only include the variables that have do not have a considerable number of missing observations. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 
and 10%, respectively. 
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FIGURE A.1 Visual Check for Common Support Assumption 
 
Note: Graphical check that the “common support” assumption is fulfilled. The assumption is fulfilled when there is 
sufficient overlap between the distributions of propensity scores across treatment and control groups. the y axis in 
psgraph is proportional by group – the treated and untreated are not necessarily on the same scale. Performed in 
Stata 15 with psgraph. 
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FIGURE A.2 Quantile Regression Confidence Intervals  
 
Note: The figure displays the coefficients of a quantile regression (Koenker and Basset, 1978) and also reports the 
OLS confidence interval. 
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TABLE A.1-1 Balancing Post Matching (CHIP 1988) 
  Pre-matched Means (Variance) Post-matched Means (Variance) 
t-value for 
matched 
sample 
  Treatment Control Treatment Control  
Han  0.954 (0.044) 0.966 (0.033) 0.954 (0.044) 0.966 (0.033) -0.88 
Male  0.775 0.174) 0.469 (0.249) 0.775 (0.174) 0.469 (0.249) -0.05 
Primary School  0.087 (0.079) 0.126 (0.110) 0.126 (0.110) 0.036 (0.035) -0.07 
Middle School   0.298 (0.209) 0.420 (0.244) 0.123 (0.108) 0.042 (0.040) 0.02 
High School   0.196 (0.158) 0.256 (0.190) 0.154 (0.131) 0.088 (0.081) -0.05 
College  0.126 (0.110) 0.036 (0.035) 0.196 (0.158) 0.256 (0.190) -0.51 
Vocational School  0.123 (0.108) 0.042 (0.040) 0.298 (0.209) 0.420 (0.244) 0.55 
Technical School  0.154 (0.131) 0.088 (0.081) 0.087 (0.079) 0.126 (0.110) -0.20 
Private Sector  0.010 (0.010) 0.007 (0.07) 0.010 (0.010) 0.007 (0.007) 1.12 
Professional   0.215 (0.169) 0.125 (0.110) 0.215 (0.169) 0.125 (0.110) -0.21 
Director   0.249 (0.187) 0.025 (0.024) 0.249 (0.187) 0.025 (0.024) 0.00 
Office  0.357 (0.230) 0.169 (0.141) 0.357 (0.230) 0.169 (0.141) -0.00 
Manual Labor    0.154 (0.130) 0.630 (0.223) 0.154 (0.130) 0.630 (0.223) 0.00 
Agricultural  0.010 (0.010) 0.020 (0.019) 0.010 (0.010) 0.020 (0.019) 0.00 
Temporary   0.003 (0.003) 0.018 (0.018) 0.003 (0.003) 0.018 (0.018) -0.00 
Urban Location   0.930 (0.065) 0.889 (0.099) 0.930 (0.065) 0.889 (0.099) 0.17 
       
Observations  4,494 14,829 4,494 14,829  
Notes: Variances in parentheses. (a) t-tests for equality of means in the two samples (before and after matching if option 
both is specified). T-tests are based on a regression of the variable on a treatment indicator. Before matching or on raw 
samples this is an unweighted regression on the whole sample, after matching the regression is weighted using the matching 
weight variable _weight or user-given weight variable in mweight and based on the on-support sample. T-tests are based on 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). 
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TABLE A.1-2 Balancing Post Matching (CHS 1993) 
  
Pre-matched Means 
(Variance) 
Post-matched Means 
(Variance) 
t-value for 
matched 
sample 
  Treatment Control Treatment Control  
Han  0.982 (0.018) 0.984 (0.015) 0.982 (0.018) 0.984 (0.015) 0.00 
Male  0.784 (0.0170 0.574 (0.245) 0.784 (0.170) 0.574 (0.245) 0.00 
Married  0.918 (0.074) 0.859 (0.121) 0.919 (0.074) 0.859 (0.121) 0.13 
Religious   0.023 (0.023) 0.043 (0.041) 0.023 (0.023) 0.043 (0.041) 0.24 
Elementary   0.077 (0.068) 0.140 (0.120) 0.073 (0.068) 0.140 (0.120) 0.00 
Junior High  0.264 (0.194) 0.382 (0.236) 0.262 (0.194) 0.382 (0.236) -0.00 
Senior High  0.190 (0.154) 0.222 (0.173 0.190 (0.154) 0.222 (0.173) -0.00 
Technical School  0.015 (0.015) 0.033 (0.032 0.016 (0.015) 0.033 (0.032) -0.00 
Vocational School  0.125 (0.109) 0.063 (0.060) 0.125 (0.109) 0.064 (0.060) -0.00 
Three-year College  0.192 (0.157) 0.064 (0.062) 0.195 (0.157) 0.067 (0.062) 0.00 
Formal College  0.115 (0.103) 0.040 (0.038) 0.117 (0.103) 0.040 (0.038) -0.00 
Graduate   0.003 (0.001) 0.001 (0.003) 0.003 (0.03) 0.001 (0.001) -0.00 
       
Observations  390 1706 385 1,609  
Notes: Variances in parentheses. (a) t-tests for equality of means in the two samples (before and after matching if option 
both is specified). T-tests are based on a regression of the variable on a treatment indicator. Before matching or on raw 
samples this is an unweighted regression on the whole sample, after matching the regression is weighted using the 
matching weight variable _weight or user-given weight variable in mweight and based on the on-support sample. T-tests 
are based on Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). 
 
 
 
TABLE A.1-3 Balancing Post Matching (CHIP 2002) 
  
Pre-matched Means 
(Variance) 
Post-matched Means 
(Variance) 
t-value 
for 
matched 
sample 
  Treatment Control Treatment Control  
Han  0.949 (0.048) 0.933 (0.063) 0.949 (0.048) 0.933 (0.063) -0.18 
Male  0.808 (0.155) 0.805 (0.157) 0.808 (0.155) 0.805 (0.157) -0.11 
Married  0.963 (0.036) 0.949 (0.048) 0.963 (0.036) 0.949 (0.048) -0.13 
Primary   0.061 (0.057) 0.152 (0.129) 0.061 (0.057) 0.152 (0.129) -0.00 
Middle school  0.269 (0.197) 0.430 (0.245) 0.269 (0.197) 0.430 (0.245) -0.03 
High School   0.219 (0.171) 0.217 (0.170) 0.219 (0.171) 0.217 (0.170) -0.00 
Technical School   0.124 (0.109) 0.067 (0.062) 0.124 (0.109) 0.067 (0.062) -0.11 
Vocational School  0.204 (0.162) 0.066 (0.062) 0.204 (0.162) 0.066 (0.062) 0.03 
College  0.109 (0.097) 0.026 (0.025) 0.109 (0.097) 0.026 (0.025) 0.11 
Urban  0.703 (0.209) 0.503 (0.250) 0.704 (0.209) 0.506 (0.250) -0.05 
       
Observations  3,600 8,217 3,600 8,217  
Notes: Variances in parentheses. (a) t-tests for equality of means in the two samples (before and after matching if option both is 
specified). T-tests are based on a regression of the variable on a treatment indicator. Before matching or on raw samples this is an 
unweighted regression on the whole sample, after matching the regression is weighted using the matching weight variable _weight 
or user-given weight variable in mweight and based on the on-support sample. Urbanicity was dropped in the matching procedure 
for CHIP 2002 since it was perfectly correlated with the occupational binary variables. T-tests are based on Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1985). 
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TABLE A.1-4 Balancing Post Matching (CGSS 2003) 
  
Pre-matched Means 
(Variance) 
Post-matched Means 
(Variance) 
t-value for 
matched 
sample 
  Treatment Control Treatment Control  
Han  0.941 (0.056) 0.945 (0.052) 0.941 (0.056) 0.945 (0.052) -0.00 
Male  0.463 (0.250) 0.541 (0.248) 0.463 (0.250) 0.541 (0.248) -0.00 
Married  0.952 (0.046) 0.843 (0.133) 0.952 (0.046) 0.843 (0.133) -0.00 
Primary   0.066 (0.062) 0.132 (0.115) 0.066 (0.062) 0.132 (0.115) 0.00 
Middle school    0.131 (0.115) 0.317 (0.217) 0.131 (0.115) 0.317 (0.217) 0.00 
Highschool   0.163 (0.137) 0.189 (0.153) 0.163 (0.137 0.189 (0.153) -0.00 
Vocational   0.007 (0.007) 0.033 (0.032) 0.007 (0.007) 0.033 (0.032) 0.00 
Technical    0.166 (0.139) 0.095 (0.086) 0.166 (0.139) 0.095 (0.086) 0.00 
Junior college   0.253 (0.189) 0.135 (0.117) 0.253 (0.189) 0.135 (0.117) -0.00 
College   0.193 (0.157) 0.059 (0.056) 0.193 (0.157) 0.059 (0.056) -0.00 
Grad   0.007 (0.007) 0.005 (0.005) 0.007 (0.007) 0.005 (0.05) 0.00 
       
Observations  289 4,202 289 4,202  
Notes: Variances in parentheses. (a) t-tests for equality of means in the two samples (before and after matching if option both is specified). 
T-tests are based on a regression of the variable on a treatment indicator. Before matching or on raw samples this is an unweighted 
regression on the whole sample, after matching the regression is weighted using the matching weight variable _weight or user-given weight 
variable in mweight and based on the on-support sample. T-tests are based on Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). 
 
 
TABLE A.1-5 Balancing Post Matching (CGSS 2013) 
  
Pre-matched Means 
(Variance) 
Post-matched Means 
(Variance) 
t-value for 
matched 
sample 
  Treatment Control Treatment Control  
Han  0.921 (0.073) 0.912 (0.080) 0.921 (0.073) 0.912 (0.080) -0.08 
Male  0.747 (0.189) 0.519 (0.250) 0.747 (0.189) 0.519 (0.250) -0.05 
Married  0.833 (0.139) 0.782 (0.170) 0.833 (0.139) 0.782 (0.170) -0.00 
Primary   0.092 (0.084) 0.233 (0.179) 0.092 (0.084) 0.233 (0.179) 0.00 
Middle school    0.197 (0.158) 0.314 (0.215) 0.197 (0.158) 0.314 (0.215) 0.00 
High School   0.131 (0.114)  0.113 (0.100) 0.131 (0.114) 0.113 (0.100) 0.00 
Vocational School  0.088 (0.080) 0.048 (0.046) 0.088 (0.080) 0.048 (0.046) 0.00 
Technical School  0.016 (0.016) 0.024 (0.023) 0.016 (0.016) 0.024 (0.023) -0.00 
Junior College   0.191 (0.154) 0.072 (0.067) 0.191 (0.154) 0.072 (0.067) -0.06 
College   0.217 (0.170) 0.053 (0.050) 0.217 (0.170) 0.053 (0.050) -0.00 
Graduate School  0.024 (0.023) 0.005 (0.005) 0.024 (0.023) 0.005 (0.005) 0.14 
       
Observations  1,060 8,011 1,060 8,011  
Notes: Variances in parentheses. (a) t-tests for equality of means in the two samples (before and after matching if option both is specified). T-
tests are based on a regression of the variable on a treatment indicator. Before matching or on raw samples this is an unweighted regression on 
the whole sample, after matching the regression is weighted using the matching weight variable _weight or user-given weight variable in 
mweight and based on the on-support sample. T-tests are based on Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). 
 
 
  
 A-6 
 
 
 
TABLE A.2 Over-identification Test for Covariate Balancing 
     
     
Survey Source /Year  
CHIP 
1988a 
CHS  
1993b 
CHIP  
2002c 
CGSS  
2003d 
CGSS  
2013e 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
chi2(12)=  16.0546  60.4384 16.0546 46.053 22.631 56.39  
Prob > chi2  0.00 0.1887 0.0000 0.031 0.000  
        
Observations  19,323 1,994 11,817 4,491 9,071  
Notes: A formal test based on Imai and Ratkovic (2014) tests the null hypothesis that the IPW 
model balanced the covariates used in matching. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 
10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
TABLE A.3 Earnings Equation (2SLS) 
Dependent Variable:  ln (Monthly Earnings, in RMBs)  
Survey Source /Year:  
CHIP  
2002a,b 
CGSS  
2013a 
 
  (1) (2)  
Communist Party 
Membership  
0.170 
 (0.388) 
0.277 
(0.465) 
 
     
District Fixed Effects  YES YES  
F-statistic  66.87 345.07  
R-squared  0.060 0.3489  
     
Observations  6,706 9,071  
Notes:  (a) The instrumental variable is parental Communist Party affiliation. (b) Based 
on the urban sample. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
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Online Appendix B  
 
TABLE B.1 Propensity Stratified Regressions  
Propensity Score Strata  Coefficient Estimate 
  CHIP 1988 CHS 1988 CHIP 2002 CGSS 2003 CGSS 2013 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 
 
0.230 
(0.272) 
0.061 
(0.089) 
-0.088 
(0.631) 
0.345*** 
(0.095) 
0.545***  
(0.124) 
2 
 
0.168 
(0.141) 
0.107 
(0.083) 
0.343*** 
(0.106) 
0.247** 
(0.112) 
0.254**  
(0.098) 
3  0.232*** 
(0.037) 
0.132***  
(0.047) 
0.323*** 
(0.056) 
0.274*** 
(0.083) 
0.075  
(0.108) 
4  0.447* 
(0.263) 
0.087 
(0.062) 
0.199 
(0.155) 
0.219*** 
(0.052) 
-0.066  
(0.073) 
5  0.152*** 
(0.053) 
0.033 
(0.082) 
0.172*** 
(0.035) 
0.163 
(0.163) 
0.049  
(0.071) 
6  -0.080 
(0.200) 
0.150***  
(0.078) 
0.160* 
(0.091) 
0.194** 
(0.065) 
0.034  
(0.073) 
7  0.177 
(0.350) 
0.007 
(0.052) 
0.031 
(0.035) 
-0.313*** 
(0.095) 
-0.214**  
(0.079) 
       
Observations  51,681 1,994 11,887 4,491 9,071 
Notes: Standard Errors in parantheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
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TABLE B.2 Matching Algorithms 
 Dependent Variable: Monthly Earnings (in RMB) 
Algorithm Method NN 2:1 Matching 
with replacement 
NN 1:1 Matching 
Mahalonobis 
IPW 
Radius Caliper 
(0.20) 
Kernel 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A (CHIP 1988):       
Communist Party Membership 0.177*** 
(0.010) 
0.181***   
(0.010) 
0.189***   
(0.009) 
0.191*** 
(0.009) 
0.189*** 
(0.009) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Observations 19,323 19,323 19,323 19,323 19,323 
Panel B (CHS 1993):       
Communist Party Membership 0.094***    
(0.024) 
0.090***   
(0.024) 
0.085***   
(0.024) 
0.131***   
(0.024) 
0.0825*** 
(0.025) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Observations 1,994 1,994 1,994 1,994 1,994 
Panel C (CHIP 2002):      
Communist Party Membership 0.188*** 
(0.022) 
0.191***   
(0.023) 
0.209***   
(0.022) 
0.188***  
(0.022) 
0.209*** 
(0.022) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Observations 11,817 11,817 11,817 11,817 11,817 
Panel D (CGSS 2003):       
Communist Party Membership 0.233*** 
(0.032) 
0.237***   
(0.032) 
0.245***   
(0.031) 
0.237***   
(0.032) 
0.227*** 
(0.035) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Observations 4,491 4,491 4,491 4,491 4,491 
Panel E (CGSS 2013):       
Communist Party Membership 0.212***  
(0.052) 
0.214***   
(0.052) 
0.253***   
(0.047) 
0.199***   
(0.054) 
0.257*** 
(0.048) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Observations 9,071 9,071 9,071 9,071 9,071 
Notes: Variables used in estimating propensity score: sex dummy (1 if respondent is male and 0 if female), ethnicity dummy (1 if 
respondent is of the Han majority ethnicity and 0 if of a minority ethnicity), married dummy (1 if the respondent is married and 0 
if single), dummies for education (1 if the respondent achieved the specified level of education and 0 if not) and religion (1 if the 
respondent is religious and 0 if town). Values can be interpreted as the percent change in monthly earnings. Communist party 
membership in a dummy equal to 1 if the subject is a member of the Communist party and 0 if otherwise. Standard Errors in 
Parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
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TABLE B.3 Quantile Regressions 
 Dependent Variable: Monthly Earnings (in RMB) 
 0.25 Quantile 0.50 Quantile 0.75 Quantile 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A (CHIP 1988):    
Communist Party Membership 0.194*** 
(0.008) 
0.159***  
(0.007) 
0.135*** 
(0.008) 
Controls YES YES YES 
    
Observations 19,323 19,323 19,323 
Panel B (CHS 1993):    
Communist Party Membership 0.102*** 
(0.315) 
0.040  
(0.030) 
0.029 
(0.031) 
Controls YES YES YES 
    
Observations 1,994 1,994 1,994 
Panel C (CHIP 2002):    
Communist Party Membership 0.136*** 
(0.030) 
0.115***  
(0.022) 
0.119*** 
(0.020) 
Controls YES YES YES 
    
Observations 11,887 11,887 11,887 
Panel D (CGSS 2003):    
Communist Party Membership 0.038*** 
(0.056) 
0.020  
(0.036) 
0.033 
(0.038) 
Controls YES YES YES 
    
Observations 9,071 9,071 9,071 
Panel E (CGSS 2013):    
Communist Party Membership 0.223*** 
(0.068) 
0.233***  
(0.051) 
0.182*** 
(0.053) 
Controls YES YES YES 
    
Observations 4,491 4,491 4,491 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
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 TABLE B.4-1 Rosenbaum Bounds (CHIP 1988)  
Gamma Sig+ Sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI-  
1 0 0 0.165212 0.165212 0.157635 0.172853  
2 0 0 0.088251 0.243723 0.080331 0.251972  
3 0 0 0.044552 0.289714 0.036123 0.298698  
4 0.001225 0 0.014213 0.322239 0.00511 0.332039  
5 0.973904 0 -0.00905 0.347436 -0.01875 0.357977  
6 1 0 -0.02783 0.368033 -0.03817 0.379353  
7 1 0 -0.04379 0.385449 -0.05473 0.397537  
8 1 0 -0.05752 0.400675 -0.06909 0.413432  
9 1 0 -0.06966 0.414064 -0.08193 0.427514  
10 1 0 -0.08066 0.426081 -0.09346 0.440351  
Notes: gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors. sig+   - upper bound significance level. sig-   - lower bound significance 
level. t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate. t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate. CI+    - upper bound confidence 
interval (a=  .95). CI-    - lower bound confidence interval (a=  .95) 
 
 
 TABLE B.4-2 Rosenbaum Bounds (CHS 1993)  
Gamma Sig+ Sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI-  
1 4.30E-10 4.30E-10 0.121024 0.121024 0.084781 0.157868  
2 0.310705 0 0.01046 0.234923 -0.03038 0.276998  
3 0.996879 0 -0.0516 0.299525 -0.0908 0.347857  
4 1 0 -0.09083 0.347921 -0.13138 0.400047  
5 1 0 -0.11937 0.38523 -0.16277 0.434136  
6 1 0 -0.1428 0.411439 -0.1875 0.464085  
7 1 0 -0.1618 0.433158 -0.2081 0.491797  
8 1 0 -0.17666 0.451299 -0.22549 0.51259  
9 1 0 -0.18966 0.469065 -0.23943 0.532992  
10 1 0 -0.20179 0.484703 -0.25231 0.547123  
Notes: gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors. sig+   - upper bound significance level. sig-   - lower bound significance 
level. t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate. t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate. CI+    - upper bound confidence 
interval (a=  .95). CI-    - lower bound confidence interval (a=  .95) 
 
 
 
 TABLE B.4-3 Rosenbaum Bounds (CHIP 2002)  
Gamma Sig+ Sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI-  
1 0 0 0.362942 0.362942 0.29483 0.43134  
2 0.712764 0 -0.02075 0.718146 -0.0986 0.785225  
3 1 0 -0.25135 0.91118 -0.33769 0.97952  
4 1.00E+00 0 -0.41325 1.03916 -0.50755 1.10976  
5 1 0 -0.5407 1.13236 -0.64361 1.20491  
6 1 0 -0.64415 1.20532 -0.75438 1.27913  
7 1 0 -0.72989 1.26395 -0.84877 1.33872  
8 1 0 -0.80675 1.31265 -0.927 1.38968  
9 1 0 -0.87374 1.35433 -0.99846 1.43385  
10 1 0 -0.92896 1.3905 -1.0613 1.47297  
Notes: gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors. sig+   - upper bound significance level. sig-   - lower bound significance 
level. t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate. t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate. CI+    - upper bound confidence 
interval (a=  .95). CI-    - lower bound confidence interval (a=  .95) 
 
 
 
 
B-5 
 
 
 
 TABLE B.4-4 Rosenbaum Bounds (CGSS 2003)  
Gamma Sig+ Sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI-  
1 0 0 0.480354 0.480354 0.395073 0.558735  
2 4.00E-07 0 0.265161 0.679859 0.169027 0.762688  
3 5.63E-03 0 0.135897 0.794804 0.030456 0.875794  
4 0.183534 0 0.045364 0.866592 -0.074153 0.959258  
5 0.636796 0 -0.022168 0.919445 -0.152859 1.01638  
6 0.915482 0 -0.080858 0.966481 -0.224391 1.06903  
7 0.987802 0 -0.133331 0.999042 -0.28097 1.103  
8 0.998736 0 -0.173593 1.03078 -0.334802 1.14278  
9 0.999896 0 -0.214004 1.063 -0.384472 1.17452  
10 0.999993 0 -0.238746 1.0828 -0.426642 1.1951  
Notes: gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors. sig+   - upper bound significance level. sig-   - lower bound significance 
level. t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate. t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate. CI+    - upper bound confidence 
interval (a=  .95). CI-    - lower bound confidence interval (a=  .95) 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE B.4-5 Rosenbaum Bounds (CGSS 2013)  
Gamma Sig+ Sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI-  
1 0 0 0.422942 0.422942 0.370801 0.468287  
2 6.50E-08 0 0.169048 0.65102 0.111045 0.699623  
3 3.74E-01 0 0.012907 0.776261 -0.05407 0.825773  
4 9.99E-01 0 -0.10476 0.862256 -0.18496 0.915829  
5 1 0 -0.20274 0.926319 -0.28698 0.983245  
6 1 0 -0.27867 0.974446 -0.37912 1.03708  
7 1 0 -0.35319 1.02181 -0.4511 1.08279  
8 1 0 -0.41144 1.05917 -0.52012 1.12308  
9 1 0 -0.46545 1.08799 -0.58164 1.15766  
10 1 0 -0.50778 1.11764 -0.63061 1.19141  
Notes: gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors. sig+   - upper bound significance level. sig-   - lower bound significance 
level. t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate. t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate. CI+    - upper bound confidence 
interval (a=  .95). CI-    - lower bound confidence interval (a=  .95) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
